

1. (5 points) Consider a modification to the one-time pad where the message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^n$ and the key space \mathcal{K} consists of all n -bit strings with an even number of ones. We know that this scheme is not perfectly secure as the key space is smaller than the message space. Define a probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} in the experiment $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}$ who succeeds with probability 1 **for any** n (i.e. don't define an adversary only for a fixed value of n like 3).
2. (5 points) Let $G : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ be a pseudorandom generator with expansion factor $l(n) > n$. **Prove or disprove** that the following functions are pseudorandom generators where $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and s_i is the i th bit of s .
 - (a) $G_1(s) = G(s) \| 0$.
 - (b) $G_2(s) = G(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_{|s|-1}) \| s_{|s|}$.
 - (c) $G_3(s) = G(s \| 0)$.
3. (10 points) If $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a length-preserving keyed pseudorandom function, then prove that the below construction is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length n .
 - **Gen:** On input 1^n , choose k uniformly from $\{0, 1\}^n$.
 - **Enc:** Given $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$, choose uniform $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and output the ciphertext

$$c := \langle r, F_k(r) \oplus m \rangle.$$
 - **Dec:** Given $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and ciphertext $c = \langle r, s \rangle$, output the plaintext message

$$m := F_k(r) \oplus s.$$