

1 Lecture Plan

- Recall the definition of CPA-security
- Recall the definition of a pseudorandom function
- Give a construction of a CPA-secure encryption scheme and prove its security

2 Recap

Definition. Let F be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function. F is a **pseudorandom function** if for all PPT distinguishers D , there is a negligible function negl such that:

$$\left| \Pr \left[D^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n),$$

where the first probability is taken over uniform choice of $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and the randomness of D , and the second probability is taken over uniform choice of $f \in \text{Func}_n$ and the randomness of D .

- Example of a non-pseudorandom, length-preserving, keyed function: $F(k, x) = k \oplus x$.
- D is *not* given access to the key k . If k is known, it is easy to construct a distinguisher which succeeds with non-negligible probability (how?).

3 CPA-Secure Encryption from Pseudorandom Functions

- Let F be a pseudorandom function. Define a private-key encryption scheme for messages of length n as follows:

– **Gen:** On input 1^n , choose k uniformly from $\{0, 1\}^n$.

– **Enc:** Given $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and message $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$, choose uniform $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and output the ciphertext

$$c := \langle r, F_k(r) \oplus m \rangle.$$

– **Dec:** Given $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and ciphertext $c = \langle r, s \rangle$, output the plaintext message

$$m := F_k(r) \oplus s.$$

Theorem (Theorem 3.31 of KL). *If F is a pseudorandom function, then the above construction is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length n .*

Proof. Done in class.

□

- What is a drawback of this construction?

4 References and Additional Reading

- Section 3.4, 3.5 from Katz/Lindell