A multiqueue system serves a multiclass population. Customer classes differ in their valuation of time. Oblivious routing in which routing is not informed by current queue status or past decisions is assumed. First, we explore the structure of the routing fractions that maximises social welfare. We then analyse the case when customers are strategic and the queues have an admission price. Here we obtain the equilibrium routing fractions. We then argue that admission prices can be set to achieve socially optimal routing at equilibrium, i.e., make selfish behavior achieve a socially optimal outcome. The queue structure is inspired by the one I had seen at Tirupati but, like Lord V himself, it is omnipresent. (Joint work with Tejas Bodas and A Ganesh)
D Manjunath received his BE from Mysore University, MS from IIT Madras and PhD from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1986, 1989 and 1993 respectively. He has been with the Electrical Engineering Department of IIT Bombay since July 1998 where he is now a Professor. He has previously worked in the Corporate R & D Center of GE, Computer & Information Science Department of the University of Delaware, Computer Science Dept. of the University of Toronto and the EE Dept. of IIT Kanpur. He works in the general area of networking and performance modeling. He is a recipient of the best paper award at ACM SIGMETRICS 2010. He is an Associate Editor of IEEE Transactions on Networking, Queueing Systems, and of Sadhana: The Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences. He was the TPC chair for COMSNETS 2011 and General Chair of ACM MobiHoc 2013. He is a coauthor of two textbooks, "Communication Networking: An Analytical Approach" (May 2004) and “Wireless Networking” (Apr 2008), both of which are published by Morgan-Kaufman Publishers.