We study a game-theoretic model for security/availability in a networking context. To perform some desired task, a defender needs to choose a subset from a set of resources. To perturb the task, an attacker picks a resource to attack. We model this scenario as a 2-player game and are interested in describing its set of Nash equilibria. The games we study have a particular structure, for which we can use the theory of blocking pairs of polyhedra, pioneered by Fulkerson, to arrive a reasonably satisfactory understanding of the Nash equilibria. The subsets of resources that support Nash equilibrium strategies of the attacker, called "vulnerability sets", are of particular interest, and we identify them in several specific games of this type. An example of a game of this sort is when the set of resources is the set of edges of a connected graph, the defender chooses as its subset the edges of a spanning tree, and the attacker chooses an edge to attack with the aim of breaking the spanning tree. (Joint work with Assane Gueye, Aron Laszka, and Jean Walrand)
Venkat Anantharam is on the faculty of the EECS department at UC Berkeley. He received his BTech in Electrical Engineering from IIT Madras in 1980. He received an MS in Electrical Engg, an MA in Mathematics, a C.Phil in Mathematics, and a PhD in Electrical Engg – all from Univ. of California at Berkeley in 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1986, respectively. He is a winner of the 1987 Presidential Young Investigator award from National Science Foundation (US), the 1998 Prize Paper award of the IEEE Info. Theory Society (with S. Verdu), and the 2000 Stephen O. Rice Prize Paper award of the IEEE Comm. Theory Soc. (with N. Mckeown and J. Walrand). He is a recipient of the 2008 Distinguished Alumnus Award from IIT Madras. He is a Fellow of the IEEE.