Allocation of spectrum is an important policy issue and decisions taken have ramifications for future growth of wireless communications. In this paper, we compare the social welfare obtained from the allocation of new spectrum under different alternatives: to licensed providers in monopolistic, oligopolistic and perfectly competitive settings, and for unlicensed access. For this purpose we use mathematical models of competition in congestible resources. Initially we assume that any new bandwidth is available for free, but we also generalize our results to include investment decisions when prices are charged for bandwidth acquisition. This is joint work with Mike Honig at Northwestern University
Vijay Subramaniam received the B.Tech. degree in Electronics Engineering from IIT Madras in 1993. Subsequently, he obtained M.Sc. (Engg.) degree in Electrical Communication Engineering from IISc Bangalore in 1995 and Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He worked in the research arm of the Networks Business Sector of Motorola in Arlington Heights, Illinois, USA until May 2006. In May 2006, he moved to the Hamilton Institute of the National University of Ireland, Maynooth as a Research Fellow. During Summer 2010, he was a visiting reseacher at LIDS MIT. From Nov 2010 to Oct 2011, he was a Senior Research Associate in the EECS Department at Northwestern University. Currently, he is a Research Assistant Faculty in the EECS Department at Northwestern University.