


The Cost of Security in a Blockchain

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
Department of Electrical Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Bombay

September 26, 2018

Cryptocurrency Transaction Workflow




Double Spending Problem




- Alice pays Bob n coins for a cake
- Alice uses the **same** n coins to pay Charlie for a book

The Bitcoin Blockchain

A public database to store all transactions which is replicated by many network nodes



Block and Header Formats



- Hash = Output of cryptographic hash function

Cryptographic Hash Functions

- Easy to compute but difficult to invert
- Collision-resistant
- Pseudorandom outputs

Input	SHA-256 Output
bitcoin0	2277efd2e9051a1978682cad7a111876031f7fcdb9a2a06b5fdeee160dd8f34e
bitcoin1	dbdbac0b3072d7677fc94eebaf8eba9e81e5c3b7de6899dae12c98d6799b065a
bitcoin2	1ed7259a5243a1e9e33e45d8d2510bc0470032df964956e18b9f56fa65c96e89
bitcoin3	0c5582329503f93b4b243a986551d9e22e46ee9ba681d687078cbcbad0c7d023
bitcoin4	0a49508bf91ac4f98e6a01b575e1a3f200a5d9a03d00219aea52b15b064cdf50
bitcoin5	de6206bd52f4228ebc556c85b26e3582fa141f8839a11d2a2ca761d0f7e24ec3
bitcoin6	e1abb7b46d14bb2c3e13208ebc9790ab847f6b5265adbf154d4200b513359e22
bitcoin7	c07bed0fae2067f2ed35cc443d97aeacba0b59dcbd619f76c75477690b82d3b
bitcoin8	8ecc8a5ebc2a99db8e950c29242e7052ae2930cd60258176efe36750a4e33170
bitcoin9	38ab2bcabfbf65eb6204162d28082ad7616f2a66f20b27696262e3842b3712d0b

- SHA-256 = NIST approved CHF with 256-bit outputs

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
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bitcoin2	1ed7259a5243a1e9e33e45d8d2510bc0470032df964956e18b9f56fa65c96e89
bitcoin3	0c5582329503f93b4b243a986551d9e22e46ee9ba681d687078cbcbad0c7d023
bitcoin4	0a49508bf91ac4f98e6a01b575e1a3f200a5d9a03d00219aea52b15b064cdf50
bitcoin5	de6206bd52f4228ebc556c85b26e3582fa141f8839a11d2a2ca761d0f7e24ec3
bitcoin6	e1abb7b46d14bb2c3e13208ebc9790ab847f6b5265adbf154d4200b513359e22
bitcoin7	c07bed0fae2067f2ed35cc443d97aeacba0b59dcbd619f76c75477690b82d3b
bitcoin8	8ecc8a5ebc2a99db8e950c29242e7052ae2930cd60258176efe36750a4e33170
bitcoin9	38ab2bcabfbf65eb6204162d28082ad7616f2a66f20b27696262e3842b3712d0b

- SHA-256 = NIST approved CHF with 256-bit outputs
- At a billion outputs per second, 78 billion years required to calculate 2^{100} outputs


Who Adds Blocks?

- Mining = Process of adding new blocks to the blockchain
- Nodes which want to perform transactions broadcast them
- Miners collect some of these transactions into a candidate block



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
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- Miner who can find Nonce such that

$$\text{SHA256}(\underbrace{\text{SHA256}(\text{Version Number} \parallel \dots \parallel \text{Nonce})}_{\text{Candidate Block Header}}) \leq \text{Threshold.}$$

can add a new block

Mining Difficulty and Rewards

- Why is mining hard?
 - Brute-force search is the only way to find suitable nonce
 - Target area is small compared to output space of SHA256

$$\Pr[\text{Success in single trial}] \approx \frac{\text{Threshold}}{2^{256}}$$

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
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- Why do mining?
 - Successful miner gets rewarded in bitcoins
 - Every block contains a **coinbase transaction** which creates 12.5 bitcoins
 - Miners also collect the transaction fees in the block


Block Addition Workflow

- Nodes broadcast transactions
- Miners accept valid transactions and reject invalid ones (solves double spending)
- Miners try extending the latest block




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
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
- Successful miners broadcast solutions
- Unsuccessful miners abandon their current candidate blocks and start work on new ones



What if two miners solve the puzzle at the same time?




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
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


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
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
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


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


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


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


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
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- Nodes always switch to the chain which was more difficult to produce
- Eventually the network will converge and achieve consensus


Tamper Resistance

- Suppose Alice wants to modify block B_N




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


- Alice works on A_N branch; other miners work on B_N branch




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- Current network hashrate ≈ 50 EH/s = 50×10^{18} H/s
- One mining unit costing \$450 gives 14.5 TH/s
- Controlling 50% of hashrate = Controlling 775 million USD worth of hardware

Challenges for Enterprise Blockchains

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- Proof-of-authority is an alternative but insecure
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Thanks for your attention