

1. (5 points) Let  $p = rq + 1$  where  $p, q$  are primes. Then prove that

$$G = \{h^r \bmod p \mid h \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\}$$

is a subgroup of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  of order  $q$ .

2. (5 points) Consider the following key-exchange protocol:
1. Alice chooses uniform  $k, r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , and sends  $s = k \oplus r$  to Bob.
  2. Bob chooses uniform  $t \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , and sends  $u = s \oplus t$  to Alice.
  3. Alice computes  $w = u \oplus r$  and sends  $w$  to Bob.
  4. Alice outputs  $k$  and Bob outputs  $w \oplus t$  (which are the same).

Show that an eavesdropper who **only** sees the messages being exchanged between Alice and Bob can recover the shared key  $k$ . You have to describe the procedure used by the eavesdropper.

3. (5 points) Suppose a message  $m$  is sent to three different receivers using plain RSA encryption. Three different moduli  $N_1, N_2, N_3$  are generated (one per receiver) using **GenRSA** where the encryption exponent is fixed to  $e = 3$  in all three cases. Assume that  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1}^* \cap \mathbb{Z}_{N_2}^* \cap \mathbb{Z}_{N_3}^*$ . Suppose an eavesdropper observes the ciphertexts  $c_1, c_2, c_3$  sent to the three receivers. Describe an attack which can be used by the eavesdropper to recover  $m$  from  $c_1, c_2, c_3$ .
4. (5 points) Suppose Alice uses the plain RSA signature scheme to sign a message  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$  where  $N$  is an RSA modulus. Suppose  $m$  represents the price Alice agrees to pay Bob for some goods. Given the resulting message-signature pair  $(m, \sigma)$ , show how an adversary with access to a signing oracle can generate a valid signature for a different price  $m' = km \bmod N$  for some integer  $k > 1$ .