

1. [5 points] If  $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  is a perfectly secret encryption scheme with message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , then prove that  $|\mathcal{K}| \geq |\mathcal{M}|$ .
2. [5 points] Alice has a length-preserving pseudorandom function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ . She wants to encrypt messages of length  $2n$ . Let  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$  denote the message. Let  $m_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$  denote the first  $n$  bits of  $m$  and let  $m_2 \in \{0, 1\}^n$  denote the last  $n$  bits of  $m$ . Alice uses the encryption scheme  $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  where:

- **Gen:** Key  $k$  is chosen uniformly from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ .
- **Enc:** The message space  $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ . A string  $r$  is chosen uniformly from  $\{0, 1\}^{n-1}$  and the ciphertext  $c \in \{0, 1\}^{3n-1}$  corresponding to  $m = (m_1, m_2) \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$  is given by

$$c := \langle r, m_1 \oplus F_k(r\|0), m_2 \oplus F_k(1\|r) \rangle.$$

Here  $\|$  is the string concatenation operator.

- **Dec:** Given key  $k$  and ciphertext  $c = \langle r, c_1, c_2 \rangle \in \{0, 1\}^{3n-1}$ , the message  $m = (m_1, m_2)$  is decrypted using  $m_1 = c_1 \oplus F_k(r\|0)$  and  $m_2 = c_2 \oplus F_k(1\|r)$ .

Prove that Alice's scheme is **not CPA-secure**.

3. [10 points] Let  $F$  be a length-preserving pseudorandom permutation having key length, input length, and output length all equal to  $n$  bits. Suppose a fixed-length private key encryption scheme  $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  is defined as follows:

- **Gen:** Key  $k$  is chosen uniformly from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ .
- **Enc:** The message space  $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$ . A string  $r$  is chosen uniformly from  $\{0, 1\}^{n/2}$  and the ciphertext  $c \in \{0, 1\}^n$  corresponding to  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$  is given by

$$c := F_k(r\|m).$$

Here  $\|$  is the string concatenation operator.

- **Dec:** Given key  $k$  and ciphertext  $c \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , the message  $m$  is obtained by taking the last  $n/2$  bits of  $F_k^{-1}(c)$ .

Prove that  $\Pi$  is **CPA-secure for messages of length  $n/2$** .