

1. [5 points] Consider the Vigenère cipher where the adversary knows that the key length is 100 characters. Let $S = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 25\}$. The key generation algorithm **Gen** generates the key $\mathbf{k} = k_0 k_1 k_2 \dots k_{99}$ uniformly from the set S^{100} .

Let $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1, \dots, 25\}^*$, i.e. the set of all finite length strings from the set $\{0, 1, \dots, 25\}$. The encryption of a message $\mathbf{m} = m_0 m_1 \dots m_{n-1} \in S^n$ is given by $\mathbf{c} = c_0 c_1 \dots c_{n-1} \in S^n$ where $c_i = m_i + k_{i \bmod 100} \bmod 26$. Prove that this form of the Vigenère cipher is **not** perfectly secret.

2. [5 points] When using the one-time pad with the key $k = 0^l$, we have $\text{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$ and the message is sent in the clear. It has therefore been suggested to modify the one-time pad by only encrypting with $k \neq 0^l$ (i.e., to have **Gen** choose k uniformly from the set of nonzero keys of length l). Is this modified scheme still perfectly secret? Explain.
3. [5 points] For a negligible function **negl**, prove that $p(n)\text{negl}(n)$ is also negligible for any positive polynomial p .
4. [5 points] Let $G : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ be a pseudorandom generator with expansion factor $l(n) > n$. **Prove or disprove** that the following functions are pseudorandom generators where $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and s_i is the i th bit of s . The \parallel denotes the string concatenation operator.
- (a) $G_1(s) = G(s) \parallel 0$.
 - (b) $G_2(s) = G(s_1, s_2, \dots, s_{|s|-1}) \parallel s_{|s|}$.
 - (c) $G_3(s) = G(s \parallel 0)$.