

1. [5 points] Consider the Vigenère cipher where the adversary knows that the key length is 100 characters. Let $S = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 25\}$. The key generation algorithm **Gen** generates the key $\mathbf{k} = k_0 k_1 k_2 \dots k_{99}$ uniformly from the set S^{100} .

Let $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1, \dots, 25\}^*$, i.e. the set of all finite length strings from the set $\{0, 1, \dots, 25\}$. The encryption of a message $\mathbf{m} = m_0 m_1 \dots m_{n-1} \in S^n$ is given by $\mathbf{c} = c_0 c_1 \dots c_{n-1} \in S^n$ where $c_i = m_i + k_{i \bmod 100} \bmod 26$.

Since the size of the key space is smaller than the size of the message space, this form of the Vigenère cipher is **not** perfectly secret. Then there must exist an adversary in the perfect indistinguishability experiment $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}$ that succeeds with a probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$. Find such an adversary \mathcal{A} .

2. [10 points] When using the one-time pad with the key $k = 0^l$, we have $\text{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$ and the message is sent in the clear. It has therefore been suggested to modify the one-time pad by only encrypting with $k \neq 0^l$ (i.e., to have **Gen** choose k uniformly from the set of nonzero keys of length l).

Since the size of the key space is smaller than the size of the message space, this form of the one-time pad is **not** perfectly secret. Then there must exist an adversary in the perfect indistinguishability experiment $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}$ that succeeds with a probability greater than $\frac{1}{2}$. Find such an adversary \mathcal{A} .

3. [5 points] For negligible functions negl_1 and negl_2 , prove that $p_1(n)\text{negl}_1(n) + p_2(n)\text{negl}_2(n)$ is also negligible for any positive polynomials p_1, p_2 .