# Rank-1 Constraint Systems

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# Proving Statements using SNARKs

- SNARK = Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge
  - Protocols that enable verifiable computation
  - Succinct = Proofs are smaller than size of statement
  - Non-interactive = A single message from prover to verifier
  - Argument = Soundness only guaranteed for PPT provers
  - Knowledge = Prover knows a witness (secret information)
- zkSNARK = Zero-Knowledge SNARK
- To prove statements using SNARKs, they have to be expressed as arithmetic circuits
  - · Circuit variables are prime field elements
  - Only addition and multiplication are allowed
- Prime fields
  - $\mathbb{F}_p = \{0, 1, ..., p-1\}$  where p is a prime
  - Arithmetic modulo p
- R1CS is one method for arithmetizing statements

## Rank-1 Constraint Systems

Statement is represented using quadratic constraints of the form

$$\left(u_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n a_i u_i\right) \cdot \left(v_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n a_i v_i\right) = \left(w_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n a_i w_i\right)$$

- The  $u_i, v_i, w_i$  values are determined by the statement
- The a<sub>i</sub>'s are witness values specific to the instance
- Why rank 1?


$$\begin{pmatrix} u_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n a_i u_i \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} v_0 + \sum_{i=1}^n a_i v_i \end{pmatrix} = \langle \mathbf{u}, (1, \mathbf{a}) \rangle \cdot \langle \mathbf{v}, (1, \mathbf{a}) \rangle$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \mathbf{a} \end{bmatrix} \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} u_0 \\ u_1 \\ \vdots \\ u_n \end{bmatrix}} \begin{bmatrix} v_0 & v_1 & \cdots & v_n \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{1} \\ \mathbf{a}^T \end{bmatrix}$$

The matrix M has rank one

#### R1CS for SHA256

- Suppose we wanted to prove that we know the preimage of a SHA256 hash
  - Given a public  $y \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$ , we know x such that y = SHA256(x)
- How can this statement be represented in a R1CS?
- SHA-256 Hash Computation
  - 1. Padded input is split into N 512-bit blocks  $M^{(1)}, M^{(2)}, \dots, M^{(N)}$
  - 2. Given  $H^{(i-1)}$ , the next  $H^{(i)}$  is calculated using a function f



- 3. *f* is called a *compression function*
- 4.  $H^{(N)}$  is the output of SHA-256 for input M

# SHA-256 Compression Function Building Blocks

- U, V, W are 32-bit words
- $U \wedge V$ ,  $U \vee V$ ,  $U \oplus V$  denote bitwise AND, OR, XOR
- U + V denotes integer sum modulo 2<sup>32</sup>
- ¬U denotes bitwise complement
- For  $1 \le n \le 32$ , the shift right and rotate right operations

$$\mathsf{SHR}^n(U) = \underbrace{000\cdots000}_{n\ zeros} u_0 u_1 \cdots u_{30-n} u_{31-n},$$
 
$$\mathsf{ROTR}^n(U) = u_{31-n+1} u_{31-n+2} \cdots u_{30} u_{31} u_0 u_1 \cdots u_{30-n} u_{31-n},$$

Bitwise choice and majority functions

$$Ch(U, V, W) = (U \land V) \oplus (\neg U \land W),$$
  

$$Maj(U, V, W) = (U \land V) \oplus (U \land W) \oplus (V \land W),$$

Let

$$\begin{split} & \Sigma_0(U) = \mathsf{ROTR}^2(U) \oplus \mathsf{ROTR}^{13}(U) \oplus \mathsf{ROTR}^{22}(U) \\ & \Sigma_1(U) = \mathsf{ROTR}^6(U) \oplus \mathsf{ROTR}^{11}(U) \oplus \mathsf{ROTR}^{25}(U) \\ & \sigma_0(U) = \mathsf{ROTR}^7(U) \oplus \mathsf{ROTR}^{18}(U) \oplus \mathsf{SHR}^3(U) \\ & \sigma_1(U) = \mathsf{ROTR}^{17}(U) \oplus \mathsf{ROTR}^{19}(U) \oplus \mathsf{SHR}^{10}(U) \end{split}$$

## SHA-256 Compression Function Calculation

- Maintains internal state of 64 32-bit words  $\{W_i \mid j = 0, 1, \dots, 63\}$
- Also uses 64 constant 32-bit words K<sub>0</sub>, K<sub>1</sub>,..., K<sub>63</sub> derived from the first 64 prime numbers 2, 3, 5,..., 307, 311
- $f(M^{(i)}, H^{(i-1)})$  proceeds as follows
  - 1. Internal state initialization

$$W_{j} = \begin{cases} M_{j}^{(i)} & 0 \le j \le 15, \\ \sigma_{1}(W_{j-2}) + W_{j-7} + \sigma_{0}(W_{j-15}) + W_{j-16} & 16 \le j \le 63. \end{cases}$$

2. Initialize eight 32-bit words

$$(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) = (H_0^{(i-1)}, H_1^{(i-1)}, \dots, H_6^{(i-1)}, H_7^{(i-1)}).$$

3. For 
$$j=0,1,\ldots,63$$
, iteratively update  $A,B,\ldots,H$  
$$T_1=H+\Sigma_1(E)+\mathrm{Ch}(E,F,G)+K_j+W_j$$
 
$$T_2=\Sigma_0(A)+\mathrm{Maj}(A,B,C)$$
 
$$(A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H)=(T_1+T_2,A,B,C,D+T_1,E,F,G)$$

4. Calculate  $H^{(i)}$  from  $H^{(i-1)}$ 

$$(H_0^{(i)}, H_1^{(i)}, \dots, H_7^{(i)}) = \left(A + H_0^{(i-1)}, B + H_1^{(i-1)}, \dots, H + H_7^{(i-1)}\right).$$

• How to represent this calculation using an arithmetic circuit?

## **Boolean Gates in R1CS**

- AND and OR Gates
  - If  $a \in \mathbb{F}_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$  satisfies a(1-a) = 0, then  $a \in \{0, 1\}$
  - Given  $a_1(1-a_1)=0$ ,  $a_2(1-a_2)=0$ 
    - a<sub>3</sub> = a<sub>1</sub> ∧ a<sub>2</sub> is expressed as

$$a_1 a_2 = a_3$$

•  $a_3 = a_1 \lor a_2$  is expressed as

$$(1-a_1)\cdot(1-a_2)=1-a_3$$

- XOR Gate
  - Given  $a_1(1-a_1)=0, a_2(1-a_2)=0$ , we can express  $a_3=a_1\oplus a_2$  as

$$(a_1+a_1)\cdot a_2=a_1+a_2-a_3.$$

- If  $a_2 = 0$ , then  $a_3 = a_1$
- If  $a_2 = 1$ , then  $a_3 = 1 a_1$
- NOT Gate
  - Given  $a_1(1-a_1)=0$ , we can express  $a_2=\neg a_1$  as

$$(1-a_1)\cdot 1=a_2.$$

## Operations on 32-bit Words

- A 32-bit word = Vector of 32 booleans
  - $U = [U_0, U_1, \dots, U_{31}]$
  - Costs 32 constraints of the form x(1-x)=0
- Assume field size p ≫ 2<sup>32</sup>
- To calculate  $W = U + V \mod 2^{32}$ 
  - Calculate field element  $u = \sum_{i=0}^{31} U_i \cdot 2^i$
  - Calculate field element  $v = \sum_{i=0}^{31} V_i \cdot 2^i$
  - Allocate 33 bits  $W = [W_0, W_1, \dots, W_{32}]$
  - Calculate field element  $w = \sum_{i=0}^{32} W_i \cdot 2^i$
  - Check that w = u + v
  - Truncate W to 32 bits
- The above calculation is an example of non-deterministic computation
  - Same as the N in NP
  - The circuit does not calculate W
  - It only checks that a given W satisfies the required constraints
  - Ubiquitous technique in arithmetization

## Operations on 32-bit Words

- Suppose U, V, W are 32-bit words
- A 32-bit word = Vector of 32 booleans
  - $U = [U_0, U_1, \ldots, U_{31}]$
- Calculating U ∧ V, U ∨ V, U ⊕ V involves applying bitwise R1CS constraints
- Similar strategy is used for bitwise choice and majority functions

$$Ch(U, V, W) = (U \land V) \oplus (\neg U \land W),$$

$$Maj(U, V, W) = (U \land V) \oplus (U \land W) \oplus (V \land W),$$

Consider shift right and rotate right operations

SHR<sup>n</sup>(U) = 
$$\underbrace{000 \cdots 000}_{n \text{ zeros}} U_0 U_1 \cdots U_{30-n} U_{31-n},$$
  
ROTR<sup>n</sup>(U) =  $U_{31-n+1} U_{31-n+2} \cdots U_{30} U_{31} U_0 U_1 \cdots U_{30-n} U_{31-n},$ 

• These only require equality constraints of the form  $V_i \cdot 1 = U_i$  or  $V_i \cdot 1 = 0$ 

#### Collection of R1CS Constraints

The statement to be proved will involve n constraints of the form

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i u_{i,q}\right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_{i,q}\right) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_{i,q}\right)$$

for  $q = 1, 2, \dots, n$  where

- $a_0 = 1$  and  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_m$  are variables taking values in  $\mathbb{F}$
- $u_{i,q}, v_{i,q}, w_{i,q}$  are constants in  $\mathbb{F}$  specifying the qth equation
- For example, consider the AND gate  $a_3 = a_1 \wedge a_2$ 
  - Three variables and three constraints  $\implies m = n = 3$
  - $a_1(1-a_1)=0$ 
    - $u_{1,1} = 1$  and other  $u_{i,1}$  are zero
    - $v_{0,1} = 1, v_{1,1} = -1$  and other  $v_{i,1}$  are zero
    - All w<sub>i,1</sub> are zero
  - $a_2(1-a_2)=0$ 
    - $u_{2,2} = 1$  and other  $u_{i,2}$  are zero
    - $v_{0,2} = 1, v_{2,2} = -1$  and other  $v_{i,2}$  are zero
    - All w<sub>i,2</sub> are zero
  - $a_1 a_2 = a_3$ 
    - $u_{1,3} = v_{2,3} = w_{3,3} = 1$  and all others are zero

# R1CS Constraints to a Polynomial Constraint

- Proposed in Gennaro, Gentry, Parno, Raykova (GGPR13)
- Suppose we have *n* constraints of the form

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i u_{i,q}\right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_{i,q}\right) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_{i,q}\right)$$

- Pick distinct  $r_1, r_2, \dots, r_n$  from  $\mathbb{F}$  and define  $t(X) = \prod_{q=1}^n (X r_q)$
- Find degree n-1 polynomials  $u_i(X), v_i(X), w_i(X)$  such that

$$u_i(r_q) = u_{i,q}, \quad v_i(r_q) = v_{i,q}, \quad w_i(r_q) = w_{i,q}$$

for 
$$i = 0, 1, ..., m$$
 and  $q = 1, 2, ..., n$ 

• Variables  $a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_m$  satisfy the *n* constraints  $\iff$  for each  $r_q$ 

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i u_i(r_q)\right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(r_q)\right) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(r_q)\right)$$

- Recall that a polynomial f(X) has a factor  $X \alpha \iff f(\alpha) = 0$
- Variables  $a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_m$  satisfy the *n* constraints  $\iff t(X)$  divides

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i u_i(X)\right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(X)\right) - \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(X)\right)$$

## **Quadratic Arithmetic Programs**

A quadratic arithmetic program is given by

$$(\mathbb{F}, I, \{u_i(X), v_i(X), w_i(X)\}_{i=0}^m, t(X))$$

#### where

- F is a finite field
- *I* is the number of variables expressing the statement,  $1 \le I \le m$ 
  - The variables are rearranged to ensure that a<sub>1</sub>, a<sub>2</sub>,..., a<sub>J</sub> represent the statement
- $t(X) = \prod_{q=1}^{n} (X r_q)$  for  $r_1, r_2, ..., r_n$  in  $\mathbb{F}$
- Such a QAP defines a language L with  $a_0 = 1$  where
  - L is the set of  $\phi = (a_1, a_2, \dots, a_l) \in \mathbb{F}^l$  such that
  - there exists a  $\psi = (a_{l+1}, a_{l+2}, \dots, a_m) \in \mathbb{F}^{m-l}$  satisfying

$$\left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i u_i(X)\right) \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i v_i(X)\right) = \left(\sum_{i=0}^m a_i w_i(X)\right) \bmod t(X)$$

• For example,  $(a_1, a_2, ..., a_l)$  could represent a SHA256 hash and  $(a_{l+1}, a_{l+2}, ..., a_m)$  represent the other circuit variables

## Remarks

- R1CS is a method for arithmetizing statements
  - Other methods include AIR and Plonkish
- Pairing-based SNARKs can prove R1CS instances resulting in constant proof sizes
  - For example, Groth16
  - But such SNARKs involve a trusted setup
- Spartan is a SNARK without trusted setup that can prove R1CS instances
  - But proofs sizes are  $O(\sqrt{n})$  for a statement of size n

## References

- Why and How zk-SNARK Works, Maksym Petkus, https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.07221
- GGPR13 https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/215
- Groth16 https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260
- Spartan https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/550